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Abstract From an external perspective, cognitive agent
behavior can be described by specifying (temporal) corre-
lations of a certain complexity between stimuli (input
states) and (re)actions (output states) of the agent. From an
internal perspective the agent’s dynamics can be charac-
terized by direct (causal) temporal relations between
internal and mental states of the agent. The latter type of
specifications can be represented in a relatively simple,
executable format, which enables different types of anal-
ysis of the agent’s behavior. In particular, simulations of
the agent’s behavior under different (environmental) cir-
cumstances can be explored. Furthermore, by applying
verification techniques, automated analysis of the conse-
quences of the agent’s behavior can be carried out. To
enable such types of analysis when only given an external
behavioral specification, this has to be transformed first
into some type of executable format. An automated pro-
cedure for such a transformation is proposed in this paper.
The application of the transformation procedure is dem-
onstrated for a number of cases, showing examples of the
types of analysis as mentioned for different forms of
behavior.
Keywords Modeling of behavior  Analysis 
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Introduction
The behavior of a cognitive agent can be considered both
from an external and an internal perspective. From the
external perspective, behavior of the agent can be descri-
bed by temporal relationships of a certain complexity
between its input (stimuli) and output (actions) states over
time, expressed in some (temporal) language, without any
reference to internal or mental states of the agent. Such
relationships are called input–output correlations by Kim
(1996, pp. 87–91). In Philosophy of Mind such a view is
considered in the perspective of behaviorism (Kim 1996).
The states of the agent are required to be publicly obser-
vable and the statements that describe these states should
be intersubjectively verifiable (Heil 2000). According to
the apologists of behaviorism Watson (1913) and Skinner
(1953), internal states of the agent (mental or inner states)
are considered to be methodologically intractable and
unnecessary, since they are based on a personal subjective
experience and evaluations and cannot be used for analysis
and predictions of the agent behavior. Descriptions from an
external perspective can be successfully used for modeling
relatively simple types of behavior (e.g., stimulus-response
behavior Skinner 1935). For less simple types of behavior
(e.g., adaptive behavior based on conditioning, Balkenius
and Moren 1999) an external behavioral specification often
consists of more complex temporal relations, relating
behavior at a certain point in time to a possibly large
number of inputs in the past (e.g., a training program), that
cannot be directly used for simulations or other types of
analysis.
From the internal perspective the behavior of the agent
can be characterized by a specification of more direct
(causal) temporal relations between mental states of the
agent, based on which an externally observable behavioral
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pattern is generated. Such a perspective is taken within
functionalism (Kim 1996). From this perspective mental
states are described by their functional or causal roles.
These can be specified in simple, executable formats. A
mental state is characterized by its direct temporal or
causal relations with input, output and other mental states.
Functionalism was originally formulated by Putnam (1975)
in terms of a ‘Turing machine’, an abstract machine to give
a mathematically precise definition of an algorithm or an
automatic procedure. However, in general other executable
(temporal) languages can be applied to specify functional
roles.
From the viewpoint of analysis, executability is an
important advantage of an internal specification over an
external one. An external specification of behavior that is
more complex than stimulus-response behavior, involves
temporal expressions of a form of complexity that makes it
useless as a basis for any simulation experiment or other
analysis method. Executable specifications, on the other
hand, enable different types of automated analysis of the
agent’s behavior, for example, by simulations of different
scenarios of the agent’s behavior or by verifying certain
global properties of an agent in its environment. To enable
automated analysis of an external behavioral specification,
the possibly complex temporal relationships between input
states and output states over time have to be reformulated
in terms of a simpler executable format. In practice, such a
reformulation process is by no means trivial. For example,
it may involve certain creativity concerning additional
intermediate states that have to be postulated and direct
temporal relations between such states that have to be
hypothesized. Moreover, it is hard to ensure by human
activity only that the reformulated specification is equiva-
lent in a certain sense to the original one (and does not
describe just another process). This paper focuses mainly
on how this issue may be addressed.
The challenge addressed is to obtain a standard method
for this reformulation process and to provide automated
support for this method, with guaranteed outcome equiv-
alent to the original specification. As a solution a standard
procedure is proposed for (automated) transformation of an
external behavioral specification first into a synthetic exe-
cutable specification using postulated intermediate states,
and subsequently into a general state transition system
format. The executable specification is based on direct
executable temporal relations between certain (postulated)
states. These states play roles comparable to sensory rep-
resentation memory states and preparation states of an
agent. The type of internal memory states of an agent used
(and shown to suffice) are memory states based on the
agent sensing (observations) of objects and processes in
his/her environment and of his/her own behavior (e.g.,
actions). Furthermore, it is postulated that before
performing an action an agent creates an internal prepa-
ration state. While simple types of agent behavior (e.g.,
variants of stimulus-response behavior) are based on a
limited number of (unrelated) internal states, more com-
plex types (e.g., motivation-based, goal-directed, adaptive)
require more complex patterns of temporal relations
between (multiple) internal states. In the approach pre-
sented this is addressed by allowing the memory states to
represent complex temporal relations. So, they are used not
only to represent world states but also temporal patterns
that occurred in the past. In this way reasoning of an agent
about his/her previous experience enables to generate
proactive, motivation-based or goal-directed behavior as
well.
The justification that the proposed transformation
method indeed provides an executable specification which
is equivalent to the original specification, is based on the
theorem (see ‘‘Analysis of the consequences of agent
behavior by model checking’’) that an external behavioral
specification entails any dynamic property if and only if the
generated executable internal specification entails the same
property.
Based on the generated executable specification differ-
ent types of (automated) analysis can be performed. First, a
developed simulation software tool applied to the gener-
ated transition system specification of the agent’s behavior
can be used to generate traces representing changes of
internal (mental) states and actions of the agent over time,
according to different environmental scenarios. Second, the
generated transition system specification is also useful to
analyze the consequences of the agent’s behavior under
such environmental scenarios.
For a given specification of externally observable
behavior, an interesting however not easily solvable
problem is how to determine the (logical) consequences of
this behavior in different environmental circumstances. For
example, to which extent different types of behavioral
repertoires of an animal situated in different food-related
circumstances in the environment ensure (or entail) the
animal’s well-being. In Computer Science, quite useful and
efficient model checking techniques have been developed
to determine consequences of a given system specification
(e.g., Clarke et al. 1999). By performing model checking it
is possible to determine automatically if a system model,
usually specified in a transition system format, entails some
dynamic property, specified by more complex temporal
formulae. Using model checking techniques this paper
contributes an automated approach for analyzing the con-
sequences of a behavioral specification of an agent in its
environment. To be able to use model checking techniques,
a behavioral specification has to be given in a simple,
executable format (as a transition system). To address this
issue the proposed approach includes an automated
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procedure for the transformation of executable specifica-
tions of agent behavior into the input format of the SMV
model checking tool (McMillan 1993) that is used for the
analysis of logical consequences of the agent’s behavior.
In the next section, the concepts for formal modeling of
externally observable agent behavior and an executable
internal specification are introduced. In ‘‘Transformation
into executable format’’, the transformation procedure from
an external into an executable internal specification and
subsequently into a general description of a finite state
transition system is described in some detail. The expla-
nation of the procedure is illustrated by a running example.
After that the proposed approach is applied for a number of
cases concerning different types of analysis of agent
behavior. More specifically, in ‘‘Analysis of agent behavior
by simulation’’ simulation of different scenarios of agent
behavior is considered, and in ‘‘Analysis of the conse-
quences of agent behavior by model checking’’ an
automated approach for the analysis of the consequences of
an agent’s behavior is described. The paper ends with a
discussion.
Formal modeling of agent behavior
From an external perspective an agent can be seen as an
autonomous entity that interacts with a dynamic environ-
ment via its input and output (interface) states. At its input
the agent receives observations from the environment
whereas at its output it generates actions that can change a
state of the environment.
States
An agent state at a certain point of time as used here is an
indication of which of the state properties of the agent and
its environment are true (hold) at that time point. Exter-
nally observable state properties of the agent are
formalized as first-order predicate logic terms using the
interaction state ontology InteractionOnt(A) (e.g., for
observations and actions). In general, an ontology is
defined as a specification (in order-sorted logic) of a
vocabulary that comprises finite sets of sorts, constants
within these sorts, and relations and functions over these
sorts. A sort is a set of objects of the same type: e.g., the
sort AGENT is the set of all particular instances of agents
conceptualized in a model. InteractionOnt can be seen as a
union of input and output state ontologies of the agent
(InputOnt and OutputOnt, respectively) to define corre-
sponding input and output agent state properties. Generally
speaking, an input ontology determines what types of
information are allowed to be transferred to the input of an
agent (or of the environment), and an output ontology
defines what kinds of information can be generated at the
output of an agent (or of the environment). InputOnt
includes the unary predicate for specifying observations of
agents called observed: STATPROP, where STATPROP is
the set of all state properties defined using InputOnt. For
example, for the constant tree the observation of an agent
can be defined: observed(tree). For specifying the actions
performed by agents the ontology OutputOnt includes the
predicate performing_action: ACTION, where the sort
ACTION consists of all actions that may be performed by
agents. For example, the execution of the action
open_window by an agent can be specified as
performing_action(open_window).
Expressing dynamic properties
To characterize the dynamics of the agent, dynamic prop-
erties relate properties of states at certain points in time.
Consider this externally observable behavior of an agent:
At any point in time if agent A observes food present
at position p, then there exists a later point in time, at
which agent A goes to p.
To express such dynamic properties, and other, more
sophisticated ones, the temporal trace language (TTL) is
used (Jonker and Treur 2002). TTL is a variant of order-
sorted predicate logic (Manzano 1996) and has some
similarities with situation calculus (Reiter 2001) and event
calculus (Kowalski and Sergot 1986).
The language TTL includes special sorts, such as: TIME
(a set of linearly ordered time points), STATE (a set of all
state names of an agent system), TRACE (a set of all trace
names), and STATPROP (a set of all state property names).
A trace can be seen as a temporally ordered sequence of
states, i.e., a trajectory. Each state in a trace c has a name
and corresponds to a unique time point, e.g., state(c, t1),
state(c, t2), etc. The sort TRACE contains a set of indi-
vidual traces that describe particular developments (or
histories) of an agent system.
Further in the paper we shall use t with subscripts and
superscripts for variables of the sort TIME; and c with
subscripts and superscripts for variables of the sort
TRACE.
A state of an agent is related to a state property via the
satisfaction relation j= formally defined as a binary infix
predicate (or by holds as a binary prefix predicate). For
example, ‘‘in the output state of agent A in trace c at time
t property p holds’’ is formalized by state(c, t, output(A))
j= p. Sometimes, when the indication of an agent aspect is
not essential, this relation will be used without the third
argument: state(c, t) j= p.
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Both state(c, t, output(A)) and p are terms of the TTL
language. In general, TTL terms are constructed by
induction in a standard sorted predicate logic way from
variables, constants and functional symbols typed with
TTL sorts. Dynamic properties are expressed by TTL-
formulae defined by:
(1) If v1 is a term of sort STATE, and u1 is a term of the
sort STATPROP, then holds (v1, u1) is an atomic
TTL formula.
(2) If s1, s2 are terms of any TTL sort, then s1 = s2 is an
atomic TTL formula.
(3) If t1, t2 are terms of sort TIME, then t1 \ t2 is an
atomic TTL formula.
(4) The set of well-formed TTL-formulae is defined
inductively in a standard way based on atomic TTL-
formulae using Boolean connectives and quantifiers.
External behavior specification
Typically a behavior specification from an external per-
spective consists of a number of dynamic properties that
express how the agent copes with different situations it
encounters in its environment. Here situations are meant as
sequences (extending over time) of states or events. A
simple example is the following dynamic property
in any trace c, if at any point in time t agent A
observes that it is dark in the room, whereas earlier at
t1 light was on in this room, then there exists a point
in time t2 after t such that at t2 in the trace c agent A
switches on a lamp.
which is expressed in formalized form as:
½½stateðc; tÞ; inputðAÞÞ j¼ observedðdark in roomÞ&
9t1\t½stateðc; t1; inputðAÞÞ j¼ observedðlight onÞ
) 9t1 t stateðc; t2; outputðAÞÞ j¼
performing actionðswitch on lightÞ
An external behavioral specification u consists of a number
of dynamic properties which have a format based on
temporal patterns described by a past statement, interval
statement and a future statement. For simplicity, the future
part has a format that prevents non-determinism in
behavior.
Definition (past, interval and future statements)
(a) A past statement for a trace c and a time point t over
state ontology Ont is a temporal statement up(c,t),
such that each time variable different from t is
restricted to the time before t: for every time
quantifier for a time variable s a restriction of the
form s £ t, or s \ t is required within the statement.
(b) A future statement for a trace c and a time point t over
state ontology Ont is a temporal statement uf(c,t),
such that for every time quantifier for a time variable
s, different from t a restriction of the form s ‡ t, or
s [ t is made.
(c) An interval statement for a trace c and time points t1
and t2 over state ontology Ont is a temporal statement
u(c, t1, t2) in TTL, that is a past statement for t2 and
a future statement for t1.
Based on these definitions an external behavioral specifi-
cation of an agent is defined as follows.
Definition (external behavioral specification)
An external behavioral specification for an agent system
consists of dynamic properties u(c, t) expressed in TTL
of the form [up(c, t) ) uf(c, t)], where up(c, t) is a
past statement and uf(c, t) is a future statement over
the interaction ontology. The future statement is repre-
sented in the form of a conditional action: ufðc; tÞ ,
8t1 [ t½ucondðc; t; t1Þ ) uactðc; t1Þ; where ucond(c, t, t1) is
an interval statement over the interaction ontology, which
describes a condition for some specified action(s) and
uact(c, t1) is a (conjunction of) future statement(s) for t1
over the output ontology of the form state(c, t1 + c) j=
performing_action(a), for some integer constant c and
action a.
When the past formula up(c,t) is true, within c at time t
a potential to perform one or more action(s) occurs. This
potential is actualized at time t1 when the condition for-
mula ucond(c, t, t1) is true, which leads to the action(s)
being performed in c at the time point(s) t1 + c indicated in
uact(c, t1).
Internal dynamics specification
An executable specification of the internal dynamics of an
agent consists of a set of executable dynamic properties,
representing temporal relations between a number of pos-
tulated internal (or mental) states. Internal states of an
agent A are described using a postulated internal state
ontology InternalOnt(A). It is often assumed that an agent
maintains a memory in the form of some internal model of
the history; some even go that far to speculate that intel-
ligence is mainly based on that (cf. Hawkins 2004). It is
assumed that internal memory states are formed based on
sensing (or observation). The state ontology InternalOnt
includes sorts and functions for defining memories about
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input states. Notice that within such states representing
memory, statements about time are made. To relate time
within such a state property to time external to states, the
function symbol present_time is used. Here the properties
of correctness and uniqueness are assumed:
Uniqueness of time
This expresses that present_time(t) is true for at most
one time point t:
8t; t00stateðc; tÞ j¼ present timeðt00Þ )
8t0; t0 6¼ t00:stateðc; tÞ j¼ present timeðt0Þ
Correctness of time
This expresses that present_time(t) is true for the current
time point t:
8t stateðc; tÞ j¼ present timeðtÞ
As an example, memory(t, observed(a)) expresses that the
agent has memory that it observed at time point t a state
property a. Furthermore, it is postulated that before
performing an action an agent creates an internal prepa-
ration state. For example, preparation_for(b) specifies
preparation of an agent to perform action b. Both memory
and preparation states belong to a type of states, which are
much better understood and physically grounded in neuro-
biological research (Dudai 1990) than intentional states
such as beliefs, desires and intentions. This motivates the
choice that has been made with respect to the internal
representations.
Each dynamic property in the internal specification of an
agent’s dynamics is specified in one of the executable
forms given in Table 1.
Transformation into executable format
The procedure described in this section achieves the
transformation of an external behavioral specification for
an agent into executable format and subsequently into the
representation of a finite state transition system.
Let u(c, t) be a non-executable dynamic property from
an external behavioral specification for agent A, expressed
using ontology InteractionOnt(A), for which an executable
representation should be found, then the transformation
procedure is specified as follows.
The transformation procedure
(1) Identify executable temporal properties, which
describe transitions from interaction states to memory
states.
(2) Identify executable temporal properties, which
describe transitions from memory states to prepara-
tion states for performing an action.
(3) Specify executable properties, which describe the
transition from preparation states to the corresponding
action performance states.
(4) From the executable properties, identified during the
steps 1–3, construct a part of the specification p(c, t),
which describes the internal dynamics of agent A,
corresponding to the property u(c, t).
(5) Apply the steps 1–4 to all properties in the external
behavioral specification of the agent A. In the end
add to the executable specification the dynamic
properties, which were initially specified in execut-
able form using an ontology, different than
InteractOnt(A).
(6) Translate the identified during the steps 1–5 execut-
able rules into the transition system representation.
The details of the described procedure are explained by
means of an example, in which delayed-response behavior
of a laboratory mouse is analyzed (e.g., Hunter 1912; Allen
and Bekoff 1997).
Initial situation
The initial situation for the conducted experiment is as
follows: the mouse is placed in front of a transparent
screen that separates it from a piece of food that is put
behind the screen. The mouse is able to observe the
position of food and of the screen. At some moment after
food has been put, a cup is placed covering the food,
which makes food invisible for the mouse. After some
time the screen is raised and the animal is free to go to
Table 1 Executable format
If a conjunction of state
properties X holds in trace c
at time point t,
(Step property)
then a(nother) conjunction of
state properties Y will hold in
trace c at time point t + c,
with c [ 0 an integer
constant
Vt state(c, t) j= X )state(c, t + c) j= Y
If a conjunction of state
properties X and a condition
property C hold in trace c at
time point t, (conditional
persistency property)
then this conjunction of state
properties X will hold in trace
c at the next time point
Vt state(c, t) j= X^C )state(c, t + 1) j= X
If a conjunction of state
properties X holds in trace c
at time point t,
(state relation property)
then a(nother) conjunction of
state properties Y will hold in
trace c at the same time point t
Vt state(c, t) j= X )state(c, t) j= Y
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any position. If the mouse comes to the position, where
the food is hidden, then it will be capable to lift up the
cup and get the food.
The behavioral specification for the conducted experi-
ment consists of environmental properties and externally
observable behavioral properties of the mouse. For the
purposes of illustration of the proposed transformation
procedure the dynamic property that describes the delayed-
response behavior of the mouse has been chosen. Infor-
mally this property expresses that the mouse goes to the
position with food if it observes that there is no screen and
at some point in the past the mouse observed food and
since then did not observe the absence of food. According
to the definition of an external behavioral specification the
considered property can be represented in the form
½upðc; tÞ ) ufðc; tÞ; where up(c, t) is a formula
9t2\t½stateðc; t2; inputðmouseÞÞ j¼ observedðfoodÞ^
8t3; t t3 [ t2 stateðc; t3; inputðmouseÞÞj¼
notðobservedðnotðfoodÞÞÞ
and uf(c,t) is a formula
8t4 [ t ½stateðc; t4; inputðmouseÞÞ j¼
observedðnotðscreenÞÞ )
state(c, t4+c, output(mouse)) j= performing_action (goto_
food)]
with ucond(c, t, t4) is
state(c, t4, input(mouse)) j= observed (not(screen))
and uact(c, t4) is
state(c, t4+c, output (mouse)) j= performing_action
(goto_food)
where t is the present time point with respect to which the
formulae are evaluated.
Step 1: From interaction states to memory states
General idea
The formula umem(c, t) obtained by replacing all occur-
rences in up(c, t) of subformulae of the form state(c, t0) j= p
by state(c, t) j= memory(t0, p) is called the memory formula
for up(c,t).
Thus, a memory formula defines a sequence of past
events (i.e., a history) (e.g., observations of an external
world, actions) for the present time point t. The time
interval for generation of an internal memory state of an
agent from its observation is assumed to be incommensu-
rably smaller than time intervals between external events
(i.e., stimuli). Therefore, in the proposed model both an
observation state and a corresponding memory state are
created at the same time point.
By a rewriting process (for the formal details for the
considered procedure we refer to Sharpanskykh and Treur
2005) umem(c, t) is equivalent to some formula d*(c, t) of
the form state(c, t) j= qmem(t), where qmem(t) is called the
normalized memory state formula for umem(c, t), which
uniquely describes the present state at the time point t by a
certain history of events. Moreover, qmem is the state for-
mula 8t0½present timeðt0Þ ) Qmemðt0Þ:
Example
For the considered example qmem(t) for umem(c, t) is
specified as:
9t2 ½memoryðt2; observedðfoodÞÞ ^ 8t3; t t3 [ t2
memoryðt3; notðobservedðnotðfoodÞÞÞÞ
Additionally, memory state persistency properties are
composed for all memory atoms. For example, for the
atom memory(t2, observed(food)) the corresponding per-
sistency property is defined as:
8t00stateðc; t00; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼ memoryðt0; observed
ðfoodÞÞ ) stateðc; t00 þ 1; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼
memoryðt0; observedðfoodÞÞ
Rules that describe creation and persistence of memory
atoms are given in the executable theory from observation
states to memory states Tho!m: For the considered
example:
8t0stateðc; t0; inputðmouseÞÞ j¼ observedðfoodÞ
) stateðc; t0; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼
memoryðt0; observedðfoodÞÞ
8t0stateðc; t0; inputðmouseÞÞ j¼ notðobservedðnot
ðfoodÞÞÞ ) stateðc; t0; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼
memoryðt0; notðobservedðnotðfoodÞÞÞÞ
8t0stateðc; t0; inputðmouseÞÞ j¼ observed
ðnotðfoodÞÞ ) stateðc; t0; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼
memoryðt0; observedðnotðfoodÞÞÞ
8t00stateðc; t00; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼
memoryðt0; observedðfoodÞÞ )
stateðc; t00 þ 1; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼
memoryðt0; observedðfoodÞÞ
8t00stateðc; t00; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼
memoryðt0; notðobservedðnotðfoodÞÞÞÞ
) stateðc; t00 þ 1; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼
memoryðt0; notðobservedðnotðfoodÞÞÞÞ
8t00stateðc; t00; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼
memoryðt0; observedðnotðfoodÞÞÞ
) stateðc; t00 þ 1; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼
memoryðt0; observedðnotðfoodÞÞÞ
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Step 2: From memory states to preparation states
General idea
Obtain ucmem(c, t, t1) by replacing all occurrences in
ucond(c, t, t1) of state(c, t0) j= p by state(c, t1) j= mem-
ory(t0, p). The condition memory formula ucmem(c, t, t1)
contains a history of events, between the time point t, when
up(c, t) is true and the time point t1, when the formula
ucond(c, t, t1) becomes true. Again by a rewriting process
ucmem(c, t), t1) is equivalent to the formula state(c, t1) j=
qcond(t, t1), where qcond(t, t1) is called the normalized
condition state formula for ucmem(c, t), t1). Moreover,
qcond(t) is the state formula 8t0½present timeðt0Þ )
Qcondðt; t0Þ:
Example
For the considered example qcond(t, t4) for ucmem(c,t) is
obtained as: memory(t4, observed(not(screen))) and
qcond(t): 8t0½present timeðt0Þ ) memoryðt0; observedðnot
ðscreenÞÞÞ:
Obtain uprep(c, t1) by replacing in uact(c, t1) any
occurrence of state(c, t1 + c) j= performing_action(a) by
state(c, t1) j= preparation_for(action(t1 + c, a)), for some
number c and action a. The preparation state is created at
the same time point t1, when the condition for an action
ucond(c, t, t1) is true. By Lemma 1 uprep(c, t1) is equivalent
to the state formula state(c, t1) j= qprep(t1), where qprep(t1) is
called the normalized preparation state formula for
ucond(c, t1). Moreover, qprep is the state formula 8t0½present
timeðt0Þ ) Qprepðt0Þ: For the considered example
qprep(t4) is composed as preparation_for(action(t4 + c,
goto_food)).
Rules, which describe generation and persistence of
condition memory states, a transition from the condition to
the preparation state, and the preparation state generation
and persistence, are given in the executable theory from
memory states to preparation states Thm!p: For the con-
sidered example:
The auxiliary atoms stimulus_reaction(a) are used to
reactivate agent preparation states for generating recurring
actions.
Step 3: From preparation states to action states
General idea
The preparation state preparation_for(action(t1 + c, a))
is followed by the action state, created at the time
point t1 + c. Rules that describe a transition from
preparation to action states are given in the executable
theory from the preparation to the action state(s)
Thp?a.
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Example
For the considered example the following rule holds:
8t0stateðc; t0; internalðmouseÞÞ j¼ preparation forðaction
ðt0 þ c; goto foodÞÞ ) stateðc; t0 þ c; output
ðmouseÞÞ j¼ performing actionðgoto foodÞ:
Step 4: Constructing an executable specification
An executable specification p(c, t) for agent A is defined by
a union of the dynamic properties from the executable
theories Tho!m; Thm!p and Thp!a; identified during the
steps 1–3. For the purposes of simulations of agent behavior
the non-executable external behavioral specification is
replaced by the executable behavioral specification.
Step 5: Constructing an executable specification for the
whole external behavioral specification of an agent
Other non-executable dynamic properties from the agent
behavioral specification are substituted by executable ones
by applying the same sequence of steps 1–4. In the end the
executable properties for generating observation states
from the states of the external world are added:
8t0stateðc; t0; worldÞ j¼ ½food ^ notðcupÞ )
state(c, t0, input(mouse)) j= observed(food)
8t0stateðc; t0; worldÞ j¼ ½notðfoodÞ ^ notðcupÞ )
state(c, t0,input(mouse)) j= observed(not(food))
8t0stateðc; t0; worldÞ j¼ notðscreenÞ )
state(c, t0, input(mouse)) j= observed(not(screen))
8t0stateðc; t0; worldÞ j¼ screen )
state(c, t0, input(mouse)) j= observed(screen)
It is assumed that an observation state is generated at the
same time point, when a corresponding state of the external
world is active.
Step 6: Translation of an executable specification into a
description of a transition system
General idea
For the purposes of practical analysis (e.g., by performing
simulation and verification) a specification based on exe-
cutable temporal logical properties generated by the
procedure described in the previous section is translated
into a finite state transition system model. The translation is
based on the fact that a computation (in our case the exe-
cution of temporal logical properties) is essentially an
(infinite) sequence of states (Vardi 1996). Therefore,
similarly to Vardi (1996), given an executable temporal
specification one can construct a finite state transition
system that generates the set of traces (by all possible
executions of transition rules) equivalent to the set pro-
duced by all possible execution of temporal logical
properties from the specification.
In computer science a finite state transition system is
often described by a tuple hQ, q0, R,?i, where Q is a finite
set of states of an agent, Q0  Q is a set of initial states, R
is a set of labels or events, which trigger the transition and
! Q · R · Q is a set of transitions. Such a representation
often assumes an explicit denotation for every state in a
transition system, which can be very numerous. However, a
more compact representation, close to the production sys-
tems style, in the form of a set of transition rules with
variables is possible (Arnold 1994).
Definition (general representation of a finite state
transition system)
Let Ont be a state ontology consisting of sorts, constants,
functions and predicates. Let At(Ont) be the set of (many-
sorted predicate logic) atoms over Ont (possibly with
variables). A general representation for a finite state tran-
sition system over Ont consists of transition rules of the
form ½PN; where P is a proposition based on atoms from
At(Ont), and N is a conjunction of atoms from At(Ont).
The meaning is that when a certain instance of P by a
certain variable assignment is true in a state, then the
instance of N by the same variable assignment will be true
in the next state; here  is a symbol for the transition
between the two states.
Such a general representation for a finite state transi-
tion system has as an advantage that it does not depend
on any particular implementation (e.g., verification or
simulation tools). However, as this generic format
describes states and transitions between them, it can be
relatively easy translated into specialized languages of
existing tools, based on the finite state transition system
representation (e.g., the input format of the SMV model
checker).
To translate the executable specification constructed at
Step 5 from the theories Tho!m; Thm!p and Thp!o into the
finite state transition system format, for each rule from the
executable specification the corresponding transition rule
should be created. Let us first consider the formulae from
the theory Tho!m: To relate states of a transition system to
the timeline used in these rules the unary predicate pres-
ent_time is used. The atom present_time(t) being true in a
given state indicates that t is the time in this state. Fur-
thermore, the assumption from Tho!m that an observation
state and a corresponding memory state are created at the
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same time point should be preserved. Thus, the time
increment rules are defined as:
present timeð0Þ ^ :ppresent timeð1Þ
present timeðtÞ ^ :Qmem ^ :ppresent timeðt þ 1Þ
Now, when a relation between states and time points is
established, the rules defined in the Tho!m can be easily
translated into the transition system format as it is shown in
Table 2.
Next, let us translate the properties from Thm!p: The
time increment rules are created similarly to the Tho!m
case based on the assumption from Thm!p that a prepara-
tion state is generated at the same time point, when the
condition for an output is true.
present timeðtÞ^
Qcprep ^ :QcondðtÞ ^ :ppresent timeðt þ 1Þ
present timeðtÞ ^ Qpreppresent timeðt þ 1Þ
Then, the rules defined in the Thm!p are translated into the
transition system format in a straightforward manner as it is
shown in Table 3.
The executable theory from preparation to output Thp!o
contains only one formula that relates a preparation state at
the time point t0 to an output state at the time point t0 + c;
its translation is given in Table 4.
Example
The executable properties from the executable specifica-
tion, translated into the transition rules for the considered
example are given below:
food ^ notðcupÞobservedðfoodÞ
notðfoodÞ ^ notðcupÞobservedðnotðfoodÞÞ
screenobservedðscreenÞ
notðscreenÞobservedðnotðscreenÞÞ
present timeðtÞ^
observedðfoodÞmemoryðt; observedðfoodÞÞ
present timeðtÞ ^ notðobservedðnot
ðfoodÞÞÞmemoryðt; notðobservedðnotðfoodÞÞÞÞ
present timeðtÞ ^ observedðnot
ðfoodÞÞmemoryðt; observedðnotðfoodÞÞÞ
present timeðtÞ ^ observed
ðnotðscreenÞÞmemoryðt; observed
ðnotðscreenÞÞÞ ^ stimulus reaction
ðobservedðnot ðscreenÞÞÞ
memoryðt; observedðfoodÞÞ
memoryðt; observedðfoodÞÞ
memoryðt; notðobservedðnotðfoodÞÞÞÞ
memoryðt; notðobservedðnotðfoodÞÞÞÞ
memoryðt; observedðnotðfoodÞÞÞ
memoryðt; observedðnotðfoodÞÞÞ
Table 2 Translation of the formulae from the executable theory
Tho!m into the corresponding finite state transition rules
Rule from the executable
theory Tho!m
Corresponding transition rules
Memory state creation rule Vt0
state(c, t0) j=
p)state(c, t0) j=
memory(t0, p)
present timeðtÞ ^ pmemoryðt; pÞ
Memory persistence rule Vt0 0
state(c, t0 0) j= memory(t0, p)
)state(c, t0 0 + 1) j=
memory(t0, p)
memoryðt; pÞmemoryðt; pÞ
Table 3 Translation of the rules from the executable theory Thm!p into the corresponding finite state transition rules
Rule from the executable theory Thm!p Corresponding transition rules
Memory state creation rule Vt0 state(c, t0) j= p )
state(c, t0) j= [memory(t0, p)  stimulus_reaction(p)]
present timeðtÞ ^ p½memoryðt; pÞ^
stimulus reactionðpÞ
Memory persistence rule
8t00stateðc; t00Þ j¼ memoryðt0; pÞ ) stateðc; t00 þ 1Þ j¼ memoryðt0; pÞ
memoryðt; pÞmemoryðt; pÞ
Conditional preparation generation rule
Vt0 state(c, t0) j= qmem)state(c, t0) j= qcprep
QmemQcprep
Preparation state creation rule
8t0; t stateðc; t0Þ j¼ ½Qcprep ^ QcondðtÞ ^V
P
stimulus reactionðpÞ
) stateðc; t0Þ j¼ Qprep
present timeðt0Þ ^ Qcprep ^ QcondðtÞ
^V
P
stimulus reactionðpÞQprep
Preparation state persistence rule
8t0stateðc; t0Þ j¼ ½preparation forðoutputðt0 þ c; aÞÞ
^:outputðAÞ ) stateðc; t0 þ 1Þ j¼ preparation forðoutputðt0 þ c; aÞÞ
preparation forðoutputðt þ c; aÞÞ^
:outputðAÞpreparation forðoutputðt þ c; aÞÞ
Stimulus reaction state persistence rule
8t0stateðc; t0Þ j¼ ½stimulus reactionðpÞ^
:preparation forðoutputðt0 þ c; aÞÞ )
stateðc; t0 þ 1Þ j¼ stimulus reactionðpÞ
present timeðt0Þ ^ stimulus reactionðpÞ^
:preparation forðoutputðt0 þ c; aÞÞstimulus reactionðpÞ
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memoryðt; observedðnotðscreenÞÞÞ
memoryðt; observedðnotðscreenÞÞÞ
present timeðtÞ ^ 9t2½memoryðt2; observed
ðfoodÞÞ ^ 8t3; t t3 [ t2memoryðt3; not
ðobservedðnotðfoodÞÞÞÞ
conditional preparation forðactionðgoto foodÞÞ
present timeðtÞ ^ conditional p reparation for
ðactionðgoto foodÞÞ^
memoryðt; observedðnotðscreenÞÞÞ^
stimulus reactionðobservedðnotðscreenÞÞÞ
preparation forðactionðt þ c; goto foodÞÞ
present timeðtÞ ^ stimulus reactionðobserved
ðnotðscreenÞÞÞ ^ notðpreparation forðactionðt þ c; goto
foodÞÞÞstimulus reactionðobservedðnotðscreenÞÞÞ
preparation forðactionðt þ c; goto foodÞÞ^
notðperforming actionðgoto foodÞÞ
preparation forðactionðt þ c; goto foodÞÞ
preparation forðaction
ðt þ c; goto foodÞÞ ^ present timeðt þ c  1Þ
performing actionðgoto foodÞ:
The described transformation procedure was implemented
in JavaTM, with an input (an external behavioral specifi-
cation) and an output (an executable specification and finite
transition system descriptions) files specified in textual
format.
The generated finite state transition system representa-
tion is used in this paper for performing two types of
analysis: by running simulations of different types of agent
behavior, and by analyzing the consequences of the agent’s
behavior by model checking techniques.
Analysis of agent behavior by simulation
In this section, the proposed transformation procedure is
applied for simulating the delayed response and the adaptive
behavior of an agent. For performing simulations, a special
software tool has been developed. Based on a specification of
agent behavior in the form of a transition system and using a
sequence of external events (i.e., stimuli) as input, the pro-
gram generates a trace (i.e., a sequence of agent states over
time). The generated in such way traces can be used for
analysis of external and internal dynamics of the agent in
different experimental settings.
Simulation of the delayed-response behavior
of the agent
First, let us consider in more detail the example of the
delayed-response behavior of the agent (a laboratory
mouse), briefly introduced in ‘‘Transformation into exe-
cutable format’’. The behavior specification for this case is
given below; it consists of environmental properties and
externally observable behavioral properties of the agent.
Environmental properties:
EP1: At some time point food has been put at the
position p1, after some time a cup has been placed upon
food and after that the screen is raised
9t1; t2; t3t2 [ t1& t2\t3 stateðc; t2Þ j¼
cup atðp1Þ& stateðc; t1Þ j¼
food atðp1Þ& stateðc; t3Þ j¼ not screen
EP2: Food stays at the position where it has been put
until it has been taken away or the agent is satisfied
8t4 stateðc; t4Þ j¼ ½food atðXÞ& not
ðmouse satÞ& notðfood taken away fromðXÞÞ )
stateðc; t4 þ 1Þ j¼ food atðXÞ; where X 2 fp1; p2g
EP3: After the screen has been raised, it will never be
drawn down again
8t5 stateðc; t5Þ j¼ not screen )
stateðc; t5 þ 1Þ j¼ not screen
EP4: After placing the cup it will not be removed
8t6 stateðc; t6Þ j¼ cup atðXÞ )
stateðc; t6 þ 1Þ j¼ cup atðXÞ; whereX 2 fp1; p2g
Properties that define the externally observable behavior
of the mouse:
BP1: The mouse is able to observe presence (absence) of
screen.
8t7 stateðc; t7Þ j¼ X ) 9t8 t8 [ t7 stateðc; t8;
inputðmouseÞÞ j¼ observedðXÞ; where
X 2 fnot screen; screeng
BP2: The mouse is always able to observe presence or
absence of food if the cup is not covering it.
Table 4 Translation of the rule from the executable theory Thp!o
into the corresponding finite state transition rule
Rule from the
executable
theory Thp!o
Corresponding
transition rules
Output generation rule
Vt0 state(c, t0) j=
preparation_for(output(t0 +
c, a)))state(c, t0 + c) j=
output(a)
preparation forðoutputðt þ c; aÞÞ^
present timeðt þ c  1Þ
outputðAÞ
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8t9 stateðc; t9Þ j¼ X & notðcup atðYÞÞ )
9t10 t10 [ t9 stateðc; t10; inputðmouseÞÞ j¼
observedðXÞ; where X 2 ffood atðYÞ;
notðfood atðYÞÞg and Y 2 fp1; p2g
BP3: The mouse is able to observe that food is taken
away if the cup is not covering it.
8t11 stateðc; t11Þ j¼ food taken away fromðXÞ& not
ðcup atðXÞÞ ) 9t12 t12 [ t11 stateðc; t12;
inputðmouseÞÞ j¼ observed
ðfood taken away fromðXÞÞ; where X 2 fp1; p2g
BP4: The mouse always arrives at the position where it
goes.
8t13 stateðc; t13; outputðmouseÞÞ j¼
performing actionðgotoðXÞÞ ) 9t14 t14 [ t13
stateðc; t14Þ j¼ mouse atðXÞ; where X 2 fp1; p2g
BP5: If the mouse is at the position with food, then it
will be eventually satisfied (after consuming food).
8t15 stateðc; t15Þ j¼ mouse atðXÞ&
food atðXÞ ) 9t16 t16 [ t15
stateðc; t16Þ j¼ mouse sat; where X 2 fp1; p2g
BP6: The mouse consumes food completely.
8t17 stateðc; t17Þ j¼ mouse sat&mouse atðXÞ )
stateðc; t17 þ 1Þ j¼ notðfood atðXÞÞ
BP7: If mouse found the position with food, it stays
there.
8t18 stateðc; t18Þ j¼ mouse atðXÞ& food atðXÞ )
8t19 t19 [ t18 mouse atðXÞ
BP8: Delayed-response behavior of the mouse
The mouse goes to the position with food if and only if it
observes that there is no screen and at some point in the
past the mouse observed food and since then did not
observe the absence of food.
8t20 ½stateðc; t20; inputðmouseÞÞ j¼
observedðnot screenÞ&
9t21\t20 stateðc; t21; inputðmouseÞÞ j¼ observed
ðfood atðXÞÞ&
8t22; t20 t22 [ t21 stateðc; t22; inputðmouseÞÞj¼ not
ðobservedðnotðfood atðXÞÞÞÞ )
9t23; t23 [ t20 stateðc; t23; outputðmouseÞÞ j¼
performing actionðgotoðXÞÞ; where X 2 fp1; p2g
The complete specification of the finite state transition
system generated for this specification is given in (Sharp-
anskykh and Treur 2005). This transition system was used
to simulate a scenario of the animal’s behavior with the
following events in the environment: food is put at position
p1 (time point 0), the screen separating the animal from
food is present (time points 0–3), a cup is put at position p1,
covering the food (time point 2), and the screen is removed
(time point 4). The results of the simulation in the form of a
trace (i.e., a sequence of states) are given in Table 5.
Furthermore, a transition system representation can be
used for construction of graphical models of agent
dynamics. A graphical model for the considered example is
Table 5 Simulation trace
illustrating delayed-response
of the agent
0: present_time(0)
world(0, food_at(p1))
world(0, screen)
9: present_time(4)
world(4, not(screen))
1: observed(0, food_at(p1))
observed(0, screen)
10: observed(4, not(screen))
2: memory(observed(0, food_at(p1)))
memory(observed(0, screen))
11: memory(observed(4, not(screen)))
stimulus_reaction(observed(not(screen)))
3: conditional_preparation_for(action(goto(p1))) 12: preparation_for(action(5, goto(p1)))
4: present_time(1) 13: not(stimulus_reaction(observed(not(screen))))
5: present_time(2)
world(2, cup_at(p1))
14: present_time(5)
performing_action(goto(p1))
6: observed(2, cup_at(p1)) 15: not(preparation_for(action(5, goto(p1))))
7: memory(observed(2, cup_at(p1)) 16: present_time(6)
world(6, mouse_at(p1))
8: present_time(3) 17: present_time(7)
world(7, mouse_sat)
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shown in Fig. 1. The state description literals with names
started with a capital letter denote variables, which allow a
concise representation of sets of states. For example, the
label mem(T, obs(not(screen))) represents the set that
includes every state corresponding to some time point t, in
which the state property mem(t, obs(not(screen))) holds. An
AND-relation between states requires all state properties of
the states in the relation to be true in order to carry out the
corresponding transition. A persistent state once activated,
remains active at every time point in the future, i.e. the state
properties of a persistent state hold for every time point in
the future. The model in Fig. 1 has been built manually.
However, tools exist such as the one described in van Ham
et al. (2002), which allow for automatic visualization of
finite state transition systems and can be used for graphi-
cal analysis of executable models. The graphical
representation is particularly useful for the analysis of large
transition systems. Usually such systems comprise a large
number of transition rules specified without any particular
order that do not provide a clear and ordered overview on
the dynamics of a system. A graphical counterpart of a
transition system makes temporal and causal relations
between states of a system explicit and allows tracking
different development paths of the system. Furthermore, the
existing tools allow zooming into particular parts of a
transition system to investigate relations between particular
states.
Simulation of adaptive agent behavior
In the second simulation example the adaptive behavior of
Aplysia californica (a sea hare) is considered. In neurobi-
ology Aplysia has been often used for investigating
classical and operant conditioning (Carew et al. 1981).
Consider a slightly simplified classical conditioning
experiment of the Aplysia’s defensive withdrawal reflex.
Before a learning phase a strong noxious stimulus (an
electric shock) on the Aplysia’s tail produces a defensive
reflex (a contraction), while a light tactile stimulus on
Aplysia’s siphon does not lead to contraction. Formally:
8t9 t stateðc; t9; inputðaplysiaÞÞ j¼ observed
ðtail shockÞ ) stateðc; t9 þ c; output
ðaplysiaÞÞ j¼ performing actionðcontractionÞ
During the learning phase a light tactile stimulus on the
Aplysia’s siphon is repeatedly paired with an electric shock
on its tail. After a few trials (for this example three
temporal pairings are assumed) the animal reacts by
contraction to the light tactile stimulus. The property that
describes the learning process of the animal from the
external perspective can be represented in the form
[up(c, t) ) uf(c, t)], where up(c, t) is the formula:
At2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7 [ t2 \ t3 & t3 \ t4 & t4 \ t5 &
t5 \ t6 & t6 \ t7 & t7 \ t &
state(c, t2, input(aplysia)) j= observed(touch_siphon) &
state(c, t3, input(aplysia)) j= observed(tail_shock) &
state(c, t4, input(aplysia)) j= observed (touch_siphon) &
state(c, t5, input(aplysia)) j= observed (tail_shock) &
state(c, t6, input(aplysia)) j= observed (touch_siphon) &
state(c, t7, input(aplysia)) j= observed(tail_shock)
and uf(c, t) is the formula
8t8 t ½stateðc; t8; inputðaplysiaÞÞ j¼ observed
ðtouch siphonÞ ) stateðc; t8 þ c;
outputðaplysiaÞÞ j¼ performing actionðcontractionÞ
with ucond(c, t, t8) is
8t8 t stateðc; t8; inputðaplysiaÞÞ j¼
observedðtouch siphonÞ
and uact(c, t8) is
state(c, t8 + c,output(aplysia)) j=
performing_action(contracts).
Fig. 1 Graphical model, which
describes delayed-response
behavior in executable form
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For this experiment c is assumed to be equal to two time
units in a relative time scale.
Using the automated procedure, from the external
behavioral specification of Aplysia a transition system was
generated. This transition system was used to simulate a
scenario of the animal’s behavior with the following
stimuli: touch the siphon (time points 0, 5, 9 and 15) and
shock on the tail (time points 1, 6 and 10). The results of
the simulation in form of a partial trace are given in
Table 6.
In the given trace the process of conditioning starts at
the state 0 (time point 0) and finishes at the state 36 (time
point 12). After that the animal reacts to a light tactile
stimulus (state 39) by producing a defensive reflex (states
42–45).
A graphical model for the example of classical condi-
tioning for Aplysia californica’s defensive withdrawal
reflex is shown in Fig. 2.
Analysis of the consequences of agent behavior
by model checking
The proposed approach for analysis of the consequences of
the agent behavior is based on the statement that the logical
consequences of a certain external behavior specification
are the logical consequences of the corresponding internal
executable specification. This statement is supported by the
following theorem.
Theorem If the internal dynamics specification p(c, t)
corresponds (by the transformation above) to the external
behavioral specification u(c, t), and w(c, t) is a dynamic
property of the agent in its environment, then w(c, t) is
entailed by u(c, t) if and only if w(c, t) is entailed by
p(c, t):
8c½pðc; tÞ ) wðc; tÞ , 8c½uðc; tÞ ) wðc; tÞ
The proof for this theorem is given in Sharpanskykh and
Treur (2005).
The consequences of the generated executable specifi-
cation are easier to determine because of the simpler
format of the internal dynamics specification. Furthermore,
the process of analysis of such consequences can be
automated by model checking techniques. For this purpose
the SMV model checking tool is used in this paper. The
SMV uses efficient algorithms to analyze a model of an
agent system and the computational tree logic (CTL)
(McMillan 1993) is used for properties (e.g., properties
concerning well-being) to check. CTL is branching-time
logic, meaning that its model of time is a tree-like structure
in which different paths in the future are possible, any one
of which might be actually realized. A particular use of
CTL will be demonstrated by an example in this section.
Table 6 Partial simulation
trace illustrating adaptive
behavior of Aplysia californica
0: present_time(0)
world(0, touch_siphon)
11: not(preparation_for(action(3, contracts)))
1: not(world(0, touch_siphon))
observed(0, touch_siphon)
…
2: memory(observed(0, touch_siphon))
not(observed(0, touch_siphon))
stimulus_reaction(observed(touch_siphon))
39: present_time(15)
world(15, touch_siphon)
3: present_time(1)
world(1, tail_shock)
40: not(world(15, touch_siphon))
observed(15, touch_siphon)
4: not(world(1, tail_shock))
observed(1, tail_shock)
41: memory(observed(15, touch_siphon))
not(observed(15, touch_siphon))
stimulus_reaction(observed(touch_siphon))
5: memory(observed(1, tail_shock))
not(observed(1, tail_shock))
stimulus_reaction(observed(tail_shock))
42: preparation_for(action(17, contracts))
6: conditional_preparation_for(action(contracts)) 43: not(stimulus_reaction(observed(touch_siphon)))
not(stimulus_reaction(observed(tail_shock)))
7: preparation_for(action(3, contracts)) 44: present_time(16)
8: not(stimulus_reaction(observed(touch_siphon)))
not(stimulus_reaction(observed(tail_shock)))
45: present_time(17)
performing_action(contracts)
9: present_time(2) 46: not(preparation_for(action(17, contracts)))
10: present_time(3)
performing_action(contracts)
47: present_time(18)
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Moreover, the language for model specification in the
SMV is similar to the executable format of agent behav-
ioral specifications, which facilitates the automatic
translation of the description of a finite state transition
system, generated by the procedure introduced in ‘‘Trans-
formation into executable format’’, into the SMV input
format. A specification in SMV is a plain text file that
consists of two main parts: (1) a specification of a transition
system and (2) a set of properties to be checked on the
transition system specification expressed in CTL.
A transition system (or model) specification in SMV
consists of a number of sections. In the section labeled
VAR, the names and types of the variables used in the
model are defined. The type associated with a variable is
either Boolean, scalar, or an array. In the second section
labeled ASSIGN the initial values of variables are defined
(i.e., the values that the variables have in the initial state)
and the transition rules between states are specified. The
transition rules are specified by case-expressions that define
the change of values of the variables of the transition
system as follows:
nextðvarÞ :¼case
boolean expression : val;
esac
All case-expressions are evaluated in every state. When
boolean_expression on the left-hand side of ‘‘:’’ of some
transition rule is evaluated to true in some state, then the
corresponding variable var will receive the value val in the
next state.
For the translation of an executable specification of
agent behavior into a SMV specification a dedicated pro-
cedure has been developed and implemented. This
procedure is applied for every dynamic property in an
executable behavioral specification as follows: First, the
normalized memory state formula qmem(t) and the nor-
malized condition state formula qcond(t, t1) are processed
by applying the steps 1–3 described below. After that
conditional preparation generation rules are added by per-
forming the step 4. Finally, the preparation and output state
creation rules are generated by performing the step 5.
Step 1: For each occurrence of an existential quantifier
of the form At1 P(t1), where t1 is a time variable name
and P(t1) is some function of the form mem-
ory(observed(t1, obs_event)), : memory(observed(t1,
obs_event)), memory(output(t1, act_event)), or : mem-
ory(output(t1, act_event)), where obs_event and
act_event are some atoms and for each occurrence of a
universal quantifier of the form Vt1 P(t1), create an atom
(a label) t1 and add to the SMV specification the
corresponding initialization rules.
Step 2: For each occurrence of the expression Q t1, t2 R
t1 memory(observed(t1, obs_event)), where Q is either
an existential or a universal quantifier, R is the compar-
ison relation for the linear ordered time line: R [ {\ ,
£}; t1 and t2 are time variables, add to the specification
the following rule:
next(t1):= case
             t2 & obs_event: 1; //memory state creation
             !t2: 0;
             1: t1; //persistence of memory
esac;
Similar rules should be added for the expressions Q t1,
t2 R t1 memory(output(t1, act_event), Q t1, t2 R t1 :
memory(observed(t1, obs_event)) and Q t1, t2 R t1 :
memory(output(t1, act_event)).
ts
present_time(T)
present_time(T2)
obs(ts)
st
obs(st)
present_time(T3)
present_time(T4)
present_time(T5)
present_time(T6)
present_time(T7)
mem(T2, obs(ts))
mem(T3, obs(st))
mem(T4, obs(ts))
mem(T6, obs(ts))
mem(T7, obs(st))
mem(T5, obs(st))
T2 < T3 T3 < T4 T4 < T5
T5 < T6 T7 < TT6 < T7
cond_prep_for(act(contracts))
present_time(T8)
mem(T8, obs(ts))
s_r(obs(ts))
prep_for(act(T+c, contracts))
present_time(T+c-1)
perf_act(contracts)
-
-
a state
a persistent state
a transition AND-relation
- negation of an
antecedent state
s_r(obs(st))
present_time(T9)
mem(T9, obs(st)) T9 <= T
-
Fig. 2 A graphical model for
the example of classical
conditioning for Aplysia
californica’s defensive
withdrawal reflex
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Step 3: For each expression of the form At1, t2 Vt3 [ t3 R
t2 AND t1 R t3 AND memory(observed(t1, obs_event1))
AND memory(observed(t2, obs_event2)) & P3(t3) ] if
P3(t) is of the form memory(observed(t3, obs_event))
For t3 \ t2 and t1 \ t3 add to the specification the
following rules:
The cases (ii) t3 \ t2 and t1 £ t3; (iii) t3 £ t2 and t1
\ t3 and (iv) t3 £ t2 and t1 £ t3 are dealt similarly.
Step 4: Add conditional preparation generation rules to
the specification:
Step 5: For each action and communication a function
output(act_event) in a formula qbt(t) add to the specifi-
cation the following rules:
When an executable specification is translated into the
SMV input format, the checking of a CTL property(ies) on
this specification can be automatically performed using the
SMV. As a result the tool generates an answer, if the
specified property(ies) are satisfied by the model. If the
property is not satisfied, a counterexample is provided. A
counter-example shows a sequence of states that resulted in
a state, in which the checked property is not satisfied. In
such a way, the reason for the checking failure can be
determined.
In this section the proposed analysis method is described
and illustrated by an example, in which next to the delayed-
response behavior (considered in ‘‘Simulation of the
delayed-response behavior of the agent’’) also the moti-
vation-based behavior of the agent is analyzed. The
specification for the delayed-response behavior (denoted
here by u1) is given in the specified section. The specifi-
cation for the motivation-based behavior (denoted here by
u2) is constructed from the properties BP1-BP7, which are
defined in the specified section, and additional properties
BP9–BP12 given below.
BP9: Motivation-based behavior of the mouse (start at
position p1)
If the mouse observes no screen and it is not satis-
fied, and at some time point in the past it observed
food at position p1 and since then did not observe
food at position p2, then the mouse will go to posi-
tion p1.
8t24½stateðc; t24; inputðmouseÞÞ j¼
observedðnot screenÞ&stateðc; t24Þ j¼
notðmouse satÞ&
At25, t25 \ t24 state(c, t25, input (mouse)) j=
observed(food_at(p1)) &
8t26; t26 t24&t26 [ t25 stateðc; t26; inputðmouseÞÞ j¼
notðobservedðfood atðp2ÞÞÞ )
At27,t27 [ t24 state(c, t27, output (mouse)) j=
performing_action(goto(p1))
BP10: Motivation-based behavior of the mouse (start at
position p2)
If the mouse observes no screen and it is not satisfied,
and at some time point in the past it observed food at
t3t1_eq: boolean ;
init(t3t1_eq):=0;
next(t3t1_eq):= case
            t1: 1;
             1: 0;
esac;
next(t1):= case 
          !obs_event2 & !t2 & t3t1_eq & 
!obs_event3: 0;
            1: t1;
esac;
next(t3):= case
           !t1: 0;
           !obs_event2 & !t2 & 
!obs_event3: 0;
           !obs_event2 & !t2 & 
obs_event3: 1;
           1: t3;
esac;
next(fmemN):= case // N is a number of a dynamic property in the input specification
ti: 1; // conjunction of all labels, created based on p( , t)
i
            1: 0;
esac;
next(fprep_act):= case 
            fmemN & tj: 1;
                     j
                      1: 0;
esac;
next(act_event):= case 
                fprep_act: 1;
                        1: 0;
esac;
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position p2 and since then did not observe food at
position p1, then the mouse will go to position p2.
8t24½stateðc; t24;
inputðmouseÞÞ j¼ observedðnot screenÞ&
state(c, t24) j= not(mouse_sat) & At25,t25 \ t24
state(c, t25, input(mouse)) j= observed(food_at(p2)) &
8t26; t26 t24&t26 [ t25 stateðc; t26;
inputðmouseÞÞ j¼ notðobservedðfood atðp1ÞÞÞ )
At27,t27 [ t24 state(c, t27, output(mouse)) j=
performing_action(goto(p2))
BP11: Motivation-based behavior of the mouse (con-
tinue at position p2)
If the mouse is at position p1 and there is no food at
p1 and the mouse is still not satisfied, then it will go
to position p2 to continue its search for food
8t28 stateðc; t28Þ j¼ mouse atðp1Þ& not
ðfood atðp1ÞÞ& notðmouse satÞ )
At29, t29 [ t28 state(c, t29,output (mouse)) j=
performing_action(goto(p2))
BP12: Motivation-based behavior of the mouse (con-
tinue at position p1)
If the mouse is at position p2 and there is no food at
p2 and the mouse is still not satisfied, then it will go
to position p1 to continue its search for food
8t30 stateðc; t30Þ j¼ mouse atðp2Þ& not
ðfood atðp2ÞÞ& notðmouse satÞ )
9t31; t31 [ t30 stateðc; t31; outputðmouseÞÞ j¼
performing actionðgotoðp1ÞÞ
Such a specification of behavior can be attributed, for
example, to an animal that feels hunger.
Both types of behavior of the agent are analyzed in two
different environmental experimental settings (E, resp. E0)
with an identical initial situation, described as follows:
The mouse is placed in front of a transparent screen
that separates it from a piece of food that is put behind
the screen. The mouse is able to observe the position of
food and of the screen. At some moment after food has
been put, a cup is placed covering the food, which makes
food invisible for the mouse. After some time the screen
is raised and the animal is free to go to any position. If
the mouse comes to the position, where the food is hid-
den, then it will be capable to lift up the cup and get the
food.
By means of the analysis method described below it is
determined for each of the environmental settings and each
type of behavior whether the combination will bring the
agent well-being.
The analysis method
(a) By means of the translation procedure described in
‘‘Transformation into executable format’’, each exter-
nal behavioral specification ui is automatically
translated into the corresponding executable internal
dynamics specification pi and related to it state
transition system representation si.
(b) The well-being properties w and w0 to be checked are
specified in CTL
(c) Using the state transition system representations si,
verification of each of the agent models with respect
to properties w and w0 is performed in the SMV model
checker, resulting in confirmed or rejected entailment
relations between the pi and w and w0.
(d) Based on the theorem introduced at the beginning of
this section the confirmed or rejected entailment
relations between the pi and w and w0 imply
corresponding confirmed or rejected entailment rela-
tions between the ui and w and w0.
The environmental conditions E are defined by dynamic
properties EP1–EP4 listed in ‘‘Simulation of the delayed-
response behavior of the agent’’. For this example, w
is the following conditional well-being property (which is
expressed conditionally for environmental conditions E):
for all traces, if the screen is removed and food is hidden
under the cup, then the mouse will eventually be
satisfied.
This property w can be expressed in CTL (Clarke et al.
1999) required for verification in the SMV model checking
tool as follows:
AGðnot screen & food& cup ! AFmouse satÞ
where A is a path quantifier defined in CTL, meaning ‘‘for
all computational paths’’, G and F are temporal quantifiers
that correspond to ‘‘globally’’ and ‘‘eventually’’,
respectively.
The automatic verification in the SMV model checking
tool showed that the property w expressing well-being
under environmental conditions E is entailed by the model
of the agent delayed-response behavior expressed by u1.
The model of agent motivation-based behavior u2 also
turns out to entail the general property w.
In the second experimental setting, described by envi-
ronmental conditions E0, the mouse observed food for some
time at the position p1, after that one cup is put covering
the food and another cup is put at the position p2, which is
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also behind the transparent screen. Thereafter, invisibly for
the mouse, food is removed from position p1 and put under
the cup at position p2. Later the screen is raised and the
animal is free to go to any position. The environmental
conditions E0 are formalized by dynamic properties BP2–
BP4, and by the property BP5:
EP5: At some time point food had been put at the
position p1, after some time one cup had been placed
upon food and another cup had been placed at the
position p2; thereafter food has been taken away from p1
and has been put at p2 behind the cup, after that the
screen is raised
9t32; t33; t34; t35; t33 [ t32& t33\t34 & t35 [ t34
stateðc; t33Þ j¼ ½cup atðp1Þ&
cup atðp2Þ& stateðc; t32Þ j¼ food atðp1Þ&
stateðc; t34Þ j¼ ½food taken away fromðp1Þ&
food atðp2Þ& stateðc; t35Þ j¼ not screen
The global property w0 to be verified in this case
expresses well-being under these environmental
conditions E0
for all traces if the screen is removed and food is
hidden behind the cup at position p2, then the mouse
will eventually be satisfied,
or, in CTL:
AGðnot screen & food atðp2Þ&
cup atðp2Þ ! AFmouse satÞ
The automated verification in SMV showed that the model
of the agent behavior u1 for the delayed-response case
does not entail property w0 expressing well-being under
environmental conditions E0. From the counter-example
generated by the model checker it is visible that the animal
went to the position p1, and did not find food there, and
after that did not go anywhere else, which caused the
failure of the property.
Unlike the external behavior specification u1 that
describes the delayed-response behavior of the agent, the
specification u2 for the motivation-based behavior
includes behavioral repertoire to deal with invisible food,
expressed in the form of properties that turn out to ensure
the entailment of global property w0. More specifically, u2
expresses the behavior that if the agent could not find food
at the position where it has seen it before, and the agent is
still not satisfied, then the agent will search for food at
another position p2. Formally this is expressed by:
8t5 stateðc; t5Þ j¼ mouse atðp1Þ& not
ðfood atðp1ÞÞ& notðmouse satÞ )
9t6; t6 [ t5 stateðc; t6; outputðmouseÞÞ j¼
performing actionðgotoðp2ÞÞ
8t7 stateðc; t7Þ j¼ mouse atðp2Þ& not
ðfood atðp2ÞÞ& notðmouse satÞ
) 9t8; t8 [ t7 stateðc; t8; outputðmouseÞÞ j¼
performing actionðgotoðp1ÞÞ
The automated verification in SMV confirmed that the
external behavioral specification u2 for the case of
motivation-based behavior entails property w0.
From the results of verification of the external behav-
ioral specifications u1 and u2 for both types of behavior in
both experimental settings with respect to the entailment of
properties w and w0 (see Table 7) we draw the conclusion
that the agent that manifests motivation-based behavior u2
fits more for surviving in the world, described by the two
types of experimental conditions than the agent that has the
delayed-response behavior u1.
Discussion
Behavior of organisms comes in a variety of forms and
complexities. Simple forms of behavior such as stimulus-
response patterns can be formalized in relatively simple
terms, based on direct stimulus-action associations that
can be considered as associations between an input state
and a subsequent output state of the organism. A
description of an organism’s behavior in terms of such
stimulus-action associations can directly be used as a
basis to model and analyze this behavior. For more
complex behavior, however, the picture is not so simple.
To describe behavior from the external perspective, in
general, an input–output correlation (cf. Kim 1996) has to
be specified which indicates how a pattern of input states
over time relates to a pattern of output states over time.
With increasing complexity of the behavior considered,
specification of such an input–output correlation will
become more complex, and not take the form of direct
stimulus-action associations anymore. The question arises
on how such more complex descriptions of behavior can
be expressed and handled, and, in particular, how such
behavior can be analyzed, for example, by simulation
and verification. The problem with specifications of
Table 7 Outcomes of the example analysis
well-being under
different environmental
conditions
w w0
Behavior Delayed response u1 + –
Type Motivation-based u2 + +
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input–output correlations for externally observable
behavior is that for any type of behavior that is a bit more
complex than stimulus-response behavior, such specifica-
tions have a temporal complexity that makes them useless
as a basis for analysis by simulation or verification.
The solution for this problem developed in this paper is
twofold. First, a formal language is put forward that allows
specifying behavior from an external perspective in terms
of dynamic properties involving input states and output
states over time. Secondly, it is shown how an external
behavior specification expressed in such a language can be
automatically transformed into an equivalent executable
specification that easily can be used to perform different
types of analysis of agent behavior. This transformation
creates a specification based on postulated internal states
(in particular memory states and preparation states), and
their direct temporal relationships. Here memory states do
not simply represent of certain aspects of the world state,
but they can provide representations of temporal relation-
ships over various states in the past.
Further, the paper illustrates how based on generated
executable specifications both simulations and the analysis
of consequences of agent behavior can be performed.
Alternative methods for temporal analysis of reactive sys-
tems are discussed in (Manna and Pnueli 1995); also these
methods can be applied, once an executable behavioral
specification has been generated.
The analysis of consequences of agent behavior is per-
formed by means of model checking techniques using the
SMV model checker. The external behavioral specification
is related to the executable SMV specification in the fol-
lowing linear way:
(1) for every quantified variable from a non-executable
specification a variable and an appropriate rule for its
update are introduced;
(2) for every nested quantifier an additional variable and
an auxiliary executable rule are introduced, which
establishes a relation between the quantified
variables;
(3) for every observed atom from a past and a conditional
formulae from dynamic properties, a corresponding
memory state creation and a memory state persistence
rule are introduced using the variables described in
(1) and (2), and variables that correspond to external
events;
(4) for every non-executable dynamic property auxiliary
variables fmem and fprep (i.e., the variables that
indicate truth values of umem(c, t) and uprep(c, t1),
respectively) and corresponding update rules are
introduced;
(5) for every action specified in uact(c,t1) a variable and
an appropriate update rule are introduced;
(6) for reactivation of agent preparation states the aux-
iliary variables and the update rules corresponding to
observed atoms from uprep(c, t1) are introduced.
Notice that an SMV-specification comprises constants,
variables and state transition rules with limited expressive-
ness (e.g., no quantifiers). Furthermore, for expressing one
complex temporal relation a large quantity (including
auxiliary) of transition rules is needed. Specification of
agent system behavior observed externally in the more
expressive predicate-logic-based language TTL is much
easier. TTL proposes an intuitive way of creating a
specification of system dynamics, which still can be
automatically translated into a state transition system
description, as shown in this paper.
In general, the transformation into executable format
can be achieved in different ways, depending on the format
of an external behavioral specification of an agent system.
For example, for translating agent behavioral specifications
expressed in modal temporal logics into executable format,
procedures described in Fisher (1996) can be used. This
paper exploits a procedure to generate an executable
internal behavioral specification from a more expressive
external specification than is possible in modal temporal
logics. The executable format introduced in this paper has
similarities with the production rule representation formats
used in existing cognitive architectures. For example, in the
ACT-R architecture (Anderson 1996) rules are stored in the
procedural memory, which is essentially specified by a
production system and can be easily expressed by formulae
from the executable specification introduced in this paper.
Also, different languages may be used for describing
internal executable specifications based on different types
of internal states. For the approach chosen here an internal
specification is expressed over memory states of an agent
that are based on the agent sensing (i.e., observations) of
not only his/her environment state, but also of patterns
over time of this environment and his/her own behavior
therein (e.g., actions). This relates to a thesis currently
recognized in neurobiological research (Di Ferdinando and
Parisi 2004) that internal representations of an agent are
based not only on the properties of the sensory input but
also on the properties of the actions with which the agent
responds to this sensory input. The internal states can
represent world states, but may also refer to more complex
temporal patterns occurring in the past. This focus on
internal representations for temporal patterns is also sup-
ported by other literature (e.g., Damasio 1999; Dennett
1991, 2001, 2005; Pockett et al. 2006; Wegner 2002,
2003). This literature discusses that for crucial cognitive
capabilities, certain mental states or brain states are
exploited that can be interpreted as representing temporal
information. Several authors put forward ideas on
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consciousness that incorporate this thesis. For example, the
notion of core consciousness by Damasio (1999) is based
on internal second-order representations of the process of
body change upon a stimulus. Furthermore, the notion of
conscious will by Wegner (2002, 2003) is based on an
internal representation of the temporal relationship
between the occurrences of a thought and an action.
Moreover, Dennett (2001, 2005) discusses how from an
asynchronous distributed process that occurs in the brain,
consciousness emerges by temporal representation of the
ordering of events.
Descriptions of memory states can also be compared to
information chunks stored in memory considered in
Kokinov (2003). When a problem has to be solved, an
organism retrieves relevant chunks from his/her memory
and combines them into an episode representing a similar
problem/situation occurred in the past. Using the termi-
nology of the approach proposed in this paper, an episode
corresponds to a (possibly complex) temporal property
based on memory states and relations between them.
Sometimes, when a structure of a neurological circuit
of an organism is known, it is possible to relate postu-
lated internal states to certain real neurological states of
an organism. The neurological model of Aplysia califor-
nica, suggested by Roberts and Glanzman (2003) allows
finding some correspondences between the postulated
internal states described in the example of this paper and
the real physical states of the organism. The observation
states from our model can be related to activation states
of sensory neurons, whereas the memory states (to some
extent) can be put into correspondence with an
enhancement of the strength of the synaptic connection
between the sensory and motor neurons and with an
associative increase in the excitability of the siphon
sensory neurons of Aplysia.
However, the rules for the creation of internal states of
an agent proposed in this approach are based on the ide-
alized assumptions described above, which may lead to
internal states that do not correspond in a direct manner to
internal states actually occurring in certain biological
organisms. If such a direct correspondence is aimed for, to
ensure the biological plausibility of the models constructed
using the proposed approach for specific forms of organ-
isms (types of agents), the rules for creation of intrinsic
states may be adjusted correspondingly.
Also other existing frameworks and approaches that
include different types of mental states of an agent (e.g.,
BDI—Rao and Georgeff 1991; KARO—van Linder et al.
1998; Schweiger Gallo and Gollwitzer 2007) can be con-
sidered for internal representation. In particular, these
frameworks recognize attitudes of agents such as desires,
intentions, and goals. More specifically, in (Gollwitzer,
1999) it is shown that intentions can be implemented by
if–then plans that describe when, where and how a goal set
of an agent has to be put into action: ‘‘if situation x is
encountered, then the agent will perform behavior y’’.
However, such if–then plans can be specified using the
approach proposed in this paper by temporal relations
between externally observable and internal states of an
agent. In this case no introduction of supplementary
internal concepts is required, and the intentional aspects of
the agent behavior are implicitly realized through the
temporal rules in the behavior specification of the agent.
However, goal and intention concepts could also be con-
sidered explicitly by adding them to our ontology in order
to get more transparency. However, this will add no
essential expressivity, as they would be a renaming of
already available complex expressions over our memory
states; see also (Jonker et al. 2002). In future work it will be
investigated, which alternative or additional attitudes of
agents could be included into the internal framework in
order to more transparently represent certain specific types
of complex behavior of an agent.
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